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1  Introduction
1. 1  The Bank of Japan’s ﬁxed-rate funds-supplying operations
The main topic of this paper is the ﬁxed-rate funds-supplying operations 
?hereafter the ﬁxed-rate operations? implemented by the Bank of Japan 
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?BOJ? as a monetary easing measure. The framework for this ﬁxed-rate 
operation was introduced in December ???? to address the turmoil in 
international ﬁnancial markets?. The ﬁxed-rate operations take the form 
of loans and the loan rates are presumably ﬁxed at the BOJ?s target for the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate, which is stipulated in the guidelines for 
money market operations. The BOJ also announces the total amount of funds 
supplied in advance of each auction. Therefore, the rate and the amount of 
funds are common knowledge among all participants. Given this information, 
every participant bids for the amount of money they wish to obtain at that 
rate. If the sum of all bids is equal to or smaller than the total allotment 
preannounced by the BOJ ?the case of ?undersubscription??, then each bidder 
obtains the amount of money that it had bid for in the auction. Otherwise, the 
allotment is proportionally allocated depending on the bids.
 Starting from December ????, the BOJ oﬀered ??? billion yen per 
operation with a term of three months ?Fig. ??. The outstanding amount in 
these operations had reached around ?? trillion yen at the end of February 
????. At the monetary policy meeting ?MPM? held on March ?? and ??, 
????, the BOJ decided to increase the frequency of the ﬁxed-rate operations 
from once a week to twice a week, and, by June ????, the outstanding amount 
had reached around ?? trillion yen. Furthermore, at an unscheduled MPM 
on August ??, ????, the BOJ introduced a six-month term in the ﬁxed-rate 
operations. The BOJ began providing additional funding of approximately ?? 
trillion yen with a six-month term, while maintaining the outstanding amount 
of funds provided by the existing three-month term operations at ?? trillion 
yen. At the MPM on August ?, ????, to further enhance monetary easing, 
the BOJ increased the outstanding amount of funds for the six-month term 
from ?? to ?? trillion yen, while keeping the funds for the three-month term 
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unchanged ?at ?? trillion yen?.
 On April ??, ????, the BOJ made the decision to increase the total 
size of ?the asset purchase program,? which had been introduced in October 
????, and in which the outstanding amount of the ﬁxed-rate operations was 
included. Its total size was increased by about ? trillion yen ?from ?? ? ?? 
trillion yen?.However, although the asset-purchasing amounts of the Japanese 
government bonds and exchange-traded funds were expanded, the maximum 
outstanding amount of the six-month ﬁxed-operation was reduced by about 
Figure 1: Implementation of the BOJ’s ﬁxed-rate operations
Notes: ?.  Each dot corresponds to the implementation of a ﬁxed-rate fund-supplying operation. 
The vertical axis indicates the duration of the operation.
?.  The ﬁve vertical lines in the ﬁgure indicate, from left to right: ??? the introduction 
of six-month operations ?August ?????, ??? the integration of three- and six-month 
operations into ?within the six-month? operation ?July ?????, ??? the introduction 
of quantitative and qualitative monetary easing policy ?QQE, in April ?????, ??? the 
introduction of QQE with a negative interest rate (NIR) policy ?QQE with a NIR policy, 
in January ?????, and ??? the introduction of QQE with yield curve control (YCC) 
?QQE with YCC, in September ?????.
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? trillion yen ??? ? ?? trillion yen?, considering the episodes of substantial 
undersubscription. Furthermore, at the MPM on July ??, ????, to address 
the observed undersubscriptions, the policy boarddecided to ?i? reduce the 
maximum outstanding amount of the ﬁxed-rate operation by about ? trillion 
yen ?instead, it increased the outright purchases of treasury discount bills by 
about ? trillion yen?, and ?ii? integrate loan durations ??three months? and ?six 
months?? to ?within six months? to respond ﬂexibly to the liquidity demand by 
ﬁnancial institutions. As a result, the total maximum amount of the operation 
was set to about ?? trillion yen.
 When the Quantitative and Qualitative Easing policy （QQE） was 
introduced in April ????, the asset purchase program was ended and the target 
outstanding amount of the ﬁxed-rate operation was abolished. Reﬂecting 
the BOJ?s provision of ample funds to ﬁnancial markets through large-scale 
purchases of a wide range of assets conducted under ??E, perceptions of 
abundant liquidity became extremely strong in the money markets. Partly 
because of these developments, demand for the ﬁxed-rate operations became 
sluggish. The outstanding amount has followed a decreasing trend, albeit 
with some ﬂuctuations. After the QQE with Negative Interest Rate （NIR） 
policy was introduced in January ????, the BOJ offered operations with an 
interest rate reduced from the previous ?.? percent to zero percent per annum. 
In addition, given the growing needs of the ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁne-tune 
their current account balances, starting from the middle of March ????, the 
BOJ changed the operations from an oﬀer of ??? billion yen with a three-
month term to this oﬀer with a two-week term. The outstanding amount of 
the operations continued to follow a decreasing trend and by March ???? 
stood at ?.? trillion yen, down from the ?.? trillion yen a year earlier. A 
widely shared view of these developments is that the ﬁnancial institutions 
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had a strong tendency to hold down their current account balances, reﬂecting 
the introduction of the NIR, combined with the uncollateralized call 
rates hovering within slightly negative territory. Under the current policy 
framework of QQE with Yield Curve Control （YCC）, which was introduced 
in September ????, the BOJ has continued to oﬀer ﬁxed-rate operations with 
a two-week term at a pace of ??? billion yen per operation once a week and 
those with about a ???-day term at a pace of ??? billion yen per operation 
once every seven weeks. All of these operations are oﬀered with a ﬁxed interest 
rate of zero percent.
1. 2  Observed bidding patterns in ﬁxed-rate operations
While the ﬁxed-rate operations have been one of the BOJ?s main funds-
supplying measures, it is not the ﬁrst time that a ﬁxed-rate operation has 
been adopted as a central bank?s fund-supplying tool?. Until June ??, ????, 
the European Central Bank （ECB）?s main reﬁnancing operations had been 
conducted as ﬁxed-rate tenders. In these operations, it is well known that 
severe overbidding was observed, i.e., the total bids drastically exceed the total 
allotment oﬀered by the ECB. The bid-to-cover ratio ?the total amount of 
bids/amount of funds provided? exceeded ????.
 One explanation for such overbidding, which was put forward by the 
ECB [??], is that expectations ofan interest rate hike in the near future were 
heightened, which enhanced the relative attractiveness of ﬁxed-rate operations. 
However, it was also pointed out that the bid-to-cover ratio had increased 
continuously and steadily independent of changes in expectations regarding 
future interest rate hikes. To clarify the mechanism for the overbidding, Nautz 
and Oechssler [??] introduce a simple game theoretic framework called a 
repo game. The environment that the game describes is as follows. A ﬁnancial 
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institution participating in a ﬁxed-rate operation is considered to have initial 
demand for the auction based on daily cash management. If the actual allotment 
exceeds the initial demand, an opportunity cost is incurred by holding of excess 
reserves. Meanwhile, under the condition where the interest rate applied to a 
ﬁxed-rate operation is lower than market interest rates, the diﬀerence in these 
rates will also generate a cost when the actual allotment is below the initial 
demand. Therefore, the objective function of a bidder can be expressed as a 
convex loss function that attains the minimum value when the actual allotment 
equals the initial demand. To describe overbidding, now take a bidder A and 
suppose that all bidders other than A bid their initial demand and the sum 
of their bids exceeds the total allotment oﬀered by a central bank. Then A?s 
actual quota is equal to A?s bids multiplied by the allotment ratio, which is 
strictly less than one. Thus, for the actual quota to equal the initial demand, A 
must bid more than its initial demand. Letting x be an allotment ratio that will 
be attained when all bidders choose their initial demand, the actual resulting 
allotment ratio will be lower than x. Furthermore, as bidders presume a lower 
allotment ratio in the next period, they will choose larger bids. By a continuation 
of this process, the bid-to-cover ratio explodes. This is the basic mechanism 
behind the overbidding that the repo game clariﬁes.
 However, a striking fact regarding the implementation of the BOJ?s 
ﬁxed-rate operations is that the bid-to-cover ratio has remained stable in 
general and has not shown the surges observed in the ECB?s operations ?Fig. 
??. As factors that contribute to such developments, Shino [??] points to 
the level of interest rates applied to the complementary deposit facility? and 
the recent accommodative ﬁnancial environment in Japan. First, by paying 
interest on excess reserve balances, the facility has the eﬀect of reducing the 
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves when the actual allotment is 
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above the initial demand. Next, under a situation in which market interest 
rates remain at a low level, the external funding cost incurred is suﬃciently 
small when the actual allotment is below the initial demand. As a result, it 
is considered that the cost will approximate zero if the diﬀerence between 
the initial demand and the actual allotment remains in a certain range, i.e., 
the objective function of a bidder can be expressed as a locally satiated loss 
function. With such a modiﬁed loss function, Shino [??] shows that bidding 
the same amount as in the previous auctions can remain the best response 
even when bidder A presumes that the allotment ratio will decrease. As a 
result, a rapid increase in the bid-to-cover ratio does not occur, and the ratio 
that remains within the required range can be supported in equilibrium.
Figure 2: The bid-to-cover ratio under the BOJ’s operations
Notes: ?.  Each dot indicates the bid-to-cover ratio (the total amount of bids / the amount of 
funds provided) in a ﬁxed-rate operation. 
?. The events indicated by the ﬁve vertical lines are the same as in Fig.?
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 Shino [??] also empirically ﬁnds that the actual bid-to-cover ratio 
under the BOJ?s operations was inﬂuenced by market interest rates. However, 
the eﬀects of the other potentially inﬂuential factor, i.e., the level of interest 
rates applied to the complementary deposit facility, are not considered in that 
empirical analysis. This is because the facility had been established ?October 
????? before the ﬁxed-rate operation was introduced ?December ????? and 
the interest rate applied to the facility had never been changed at that time.
 However, in January 2016, when the BOJ introduced the NIR policy, 
the interest rate level applied to the facility was changed to ??.?%. This 
change clearly enables us to examine the impact of the NIR applied to 
the facility on bidding patterns in ﬁxed-rate funds-supplying operations. 
With this situation as our motivation, in this paper, we consider a simple 
regression model to test two alternative hypotheses regarding the impact 
of the change. The fundamental questions associated with the hypotheses 
are: after controlling for the eﬀects of lowered market interest rates, has the 
introduction of the NIR applied to the facility contributed to containing the 
actual bid-to-cover ratios, or does it exert upward pressure on them? We 
explain the two hypotheses and the empirical results in the section ?, after 
reviewing the related literature in the subsection ?.? and the existing analyses 
in the section ?.
1. 3  Related literature
Our analysis is closely related to the literature on central banks? ﬁxed-rate 
operations. From the theoretical side, Nautz and Oechssler [??] propose a 
game theoretic framework to describe overbidding. Ayuso and Repullo [?] 
model ﬁxed-rate tenders conducted by the ECB, assuming an asymmetric 
objective function of the central bank, and describe overbidding as a unique 
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equilibrium. Ewerhart et al. [??] theoretically point out that the extent of 
overbidding is heavily inﬂuenced by exposure risk, i.e., the risk of receiving 
an overly large allotment. Catalao [??] argues that overbidding is inherent to 
ﬁxed-rate tenders by using a game theoretic framework and comparing ﬁxed- 
and variable-rate tenders and states that variable-rate tenders allow for some 
informational content of quantity bids to be retained, as opposed to ﬁxed-rate 
tenders.
 In terms of empirical approaches to ﬁxed-rate funds-supplying operations, 
Ayuso and Repullo [?], using both individual and aggregate bidding data, provide 
empirical evidence that overbidding in the ﬁxed-rate tenders is attributable to 
the liquidity allotment decisions of the ECB, not to expectations of a future 
tightening of monetary policy. In contrast, Breitung and Nautz [??] ﬁnd a 
positive relation be-tween bid-to-cover ratios and market interest rates in the case 
of the ECB?s repo auctions. Nautz and Oechssler [??] empirically investigate 
various theories explaining overbidding in the ﬁxed-rate tenders of the ECB and 
conclude that none of them can explain the actual overbidding on their own. 
They con-sider that existing measures to improve the eﬃciency of the operational 
framework would not eliminate overbidding.
 Next, it should be noted that the allocation mechanism of the ﬁxed-rate 
operations is essentially the same as that of rationing in a ﬁxed-price market. 
In this regard, Grimm et al. [??] examine a ﬁxed-price allocation mechanism 
where bidders are proportionally rationed if aggregate demand exceeds 
aggregate supply. They show that, although overbidding can be theoretically 
supported, participants tends to change the degree of overbidding depending 
on price levels. Bierbaum and Grimm [??] characterize an equilib-rium of a 
ﬁxed-price mechanism for the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to 
a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. They ﬁnd that bidders 
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have an incentive to overstate their demand in the case of the ﬁxed-price 
mechanism.
 Finally, regarding analyses focusing on recent NIR policies, Jobst and 
Lin [??] evaluate the NIR policy of the ECB in terms of aggregate ﬁnancial 
conditions and bank proﬁtability in the Euro area. Elliott et al. [??] and 
ViÃs?als et al. [??] propose that the ECB?s NIR policy has been eﬀective 
in exerting downward pressure on market rates and has been successfully 
transmitted to the wider economy through lower lending rates for both 
ﬁrms and households. McAndrews [??] provides a critical review of issues 
concerning NIRs in the Euro area. As for the NIR policy of the BOJ, Bank 
of Japan [?] argues that Japanese government bond yields, lending rates, 
and interest rates on corporate bonds have declined considerably since the 
introduction of the NIR policy and the measure has had substantial eﬀects. 
A simple and introductory explanation of the complementary deposit facility 
and the eﬀects of NIR to current account at the BOJ can be found in Bank of 
Japan [??].
2   Theoretical Background for Overbidding and Underbidding 
in the Fixed-Rate Operations
In this section, we begin by reviewing Nautz and Oechssler [??]?s repo game 
in more detail. Let {?, ?, ..., n} ? N be the set of ﬁnancial institutions, each of 
which are participants in a ﬁxed-rate auction. i has its initial demand di . The 
game starts with the central bank?s preannouncement of a given total allotment 
of funds a and a ﬁxed lending rate r. Given a and r, each bidder i chooses 
the amountof bids bi . Once  is determined, the allotment 
ratio, deﬁned by  is computed. We let  
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be a bid-to-cover ratio. Overbidding indicates the phenomenon where ? 
signiﬁcantly increases. Finally, the actual allotment to bidder i, denoted by ai , 
is determined by ai = qbi.
 As bidders choose their actions simultaneously, there is strategic 
uncertainty and bidders are assumed to be risk averse. Speciﬁcally, we start 
with the following quadratic single-peaked loss function, which bidder i 
minimizes πi ? ?ai ? di?2 ?Fig. ??.
 Hereafter, we assume that the game is symmetric ?di = d ?i ? N?. With 
this setup, Nautz and Oechssler [??] demonstrate the following.
Remark 2. 1 （Nautz and Oechssler [20]）
1. If   is the Nash equilibrium.
?. If   , no Nash equilibrium exists.
While the ﬁrst case corresponds to undersubscription, the second statement 
cannot explain any actual bidding behavior. To describe the overbidding 
Figure 3: A bidder’s loss function in a normal ﬁnancial environment
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phenomenon observed under the ECB operations, Nautz and Oechssler [??] 
introduce a myopic best-reply （MBR） process, an assumption regarding 
participants? bidding behavior whereby each bidder has adaptive expectations.
 More specifically, consider a strategy profile at t denoted by bt = ?b1,t , ..., 
bn,t ). Hereafter, subscript t is used to describe the dynamics of participants? bids. 
When , then i has to bid strictly more than di,t to attain the 
minimum loss. Now, suppose that bt = (b1,t , ..., bn,t ) satisfies  
and that each i follows the MBR process. This process assumes that, at t + 1, 
bidder i chooses the best response to . Thus, the bidding 
profile at t + 1, bt+1 = (b1,t+1, ..., bn,t+1) satisfies . That 
is, once the sum of the bids exceeds at , the process continues. This is the 
overbidding mechanism that Nautz and Oechssler [??] consider.
 However, as mentioned in the Introduction, the bid-to-cover ratio under 
the BOJ?s fixed-rate operations has not experienced the surges observed in 
the ECB?s operations ?see Fig. ??. Shino [??] considers that, first, the recent 
accommodative financial environment in Japan and second, the level of interest 
rates applied to the complementary deposit facility contribute to the stable 
evolution of the bid-to-cover ratio. This is because these factors together keep 
the cost at zero as long as the diﬀerence between the actual allotment and the 
initial demand remains within a certain range. Based on these observations, 
Shino [??] introduces the following locally satiated loss function to the repo 
game ?equation ??? and Fig. ??, and provides the following remark.
 ???
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Remark 2. 2 （Shino [22]）
Suppose that  and each bidder i has the loss function  expressed 
in ???. Then, there exists a  such that if  , then any bid-to-cover ratio 
that is neither an overbid nor an undersubscription can be supported by a 
Nash equilibrium .
 Remark ?.? means that, in the situation where a bidder?s loss function is 
satiated, then the stable bid-to-cover ratio currently observed under the BOJ?s 
fixed-rate auction can be described as a Nash equilibrium.
3  Two Alternative Hypotheses and Empirical Tests
In this section, we review the relationship between the lending rates in 
the fixed-rate operations and the level of interest rates applied by the 
complementary deposit facility, which is summarized in Fig. ?.
Figure 4: A bidder’s locally satiated loss function
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 Before the NIR policy was introduced in January ????, both the lending 
rate in fixed-rate operations and the rate applied to the complementary 
deposit facility were +?.?%. This rate implies that even when a financial 
institution participating in an operation unintentionally obtains an excessive 
amount of funds with the borrowing cost of +?.?% compared with its initial 
demand ?i.e., ai > di in the repo game?, the facility compensates the institution 
for the interest rate payment by paying back the money at the same rate of 
+?.?% imposed on the excess reserves held by the institution. In other words, 
the opportunity cost incurred by obtaining too much money in the fixed-rate 
operations or by holding excess reserves is regarded as ?% ?fourth column in 
Fig. ??.
 However, this relationship substantially changed after the introduction of 
the NIR policy. When the NIR policy was introduced, it was decided that the 
NIR of ??.?% would be applied to the complementary deposit facility ? more 
precisely, to the ?policy-rate balance? of each financial institution?s current 
account at the BOJ? ?. However, the lending rate in fixed-rate operations 
was cut only to ?%. Therefore, a gap between the two rates was generated and 
Lending rate in 
ﬁxed-rate operations
 ?A?
Interest rate applied to 
the complementary deposit
 facility ?B?
Opportunity cost 
incurred by holding 
excess reserves
?A?-?B?
Before 
the NIR policy
+?.?% +?.?% ?%
After 
the NIR policy
?% -?.?% +?.?%
Figure 5: Interest rate environment surrounding participants 
in the ﬁxed-rate operations
Note: The BOJ?s NIR policy was introduced in January ????.
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the opportunity cost incurred by obtaining too much money in the fixed-rate 
operations or by holding excess reserves clearly increased to +?.?%.
 Here, it should be noted ?and this forms the main subject of this paper?, 
that there are two alternative hypotheses regarding the possible eﬀects of 
increases in the opportunity cost of bidding patterns in fixed- rate operations.
 The first hypothesis, which has been widely held by market participants 
and even central bankers ?Bank of Japan [?][?]?, is that the heightened 
opportunity cost of acquiring too much money in a fixed-rate operation 
decreases the demand for the operations. In terms of the repo game, this 
corre- sponds to the decrease in the initial demand dt ? a shift of the bidder?s 
objective function to the left ?. The natural conjecture based on this view is 
that the NIR policy decreases bids in fixed-rate operations. 
 The other opposing hypothesis is derived from the analyses of Shino [??] 
and Funaki, Shino and Uto [??]?: the increased opportunity cost decreases the 
degree of satiation in the participants’ objective functions. In the context of 
the repo game, this corresponds to the decrease in kt , and a conjecture based 
on this view is that the NIR policy increases bids on its own, rather than 
decreases them, in fixed-rate operations.
 What has actually happened to the bid-to-cover ratio after the NIR 
policy? From Fig. ?, we can observe that there has been a well-contained 
evolution of the ratio; indeed, it appears to decline further after the introduction 
of the ??E with NIR policy. However, this may be largely attributable to the 
fact that the lowered market rates decrease the external funding costs incurred 
when the actual allotment ai is smaller than the initial demand di , rather than to 
the eﬀects of increased opportunity costs incurred when ai is larger than di?Fig. ??.
 As discussed in the Introduction, the original analysis of Shino [??] did 
not involve an examination of the eﬀects of the interest rate level applied to 
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the complementary deposit facility on bidding behavior simply because the 
interest rate had not been changed at that time. However, the opportunity 
costs changed when the BOJ introduced the NIR policy in ????. Thus, 
measuring the eﬀects of the NIR policy on the bid-to-cover ratio can be 
the subject of analysis. In terms of the repo game, this interesting issue can 
be restated as follows: Does the NIR policy shift the participants’ objective 
functions to the left or reduce their degree of satiation?
 In the following analysis, we first review the empirical model of 
Shino [??] to examine the relationship between the bid-to-cover ratio ?the 
dependent variable? and market rates ?the explanatory variables? and the 
estimated parameter. Next, the estimation result is updated using the latest 
data available, including data for the period after the introduction of the NIR 
policy. Finally, a modified simple regression model with a dummy variable to 
measure the eﬀects of the NIR policy alone is estimated.
Figure 6: Short-term interest rates （T-bill）
Notes: Notes: As of August ??, ????.
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 To examine the empirical relevance of the bid-to-cover ratio and market 
rates, Shino [??] runs the following simple regressions of the bid-to-cover 
ratios for three- and six-month fixed-rate operations?.
 ???
 ???
and  are the bid-to-cover ratios for the three- and six-month fixed-rate 
operations at t, respectively.  and  correspond to the three- and six-
month market interest rates, respectively.  is the term spread between 
the three- and six-month rates as a proxy for interest rate expectations.
 First, we consider the conditions on  and . For example, suppose 
that market interest rates decline. Then, the external funding cost incurred when 
the actual allotment ai is smaller than the initial demand di becomes small. As 
the cost becomes small, a bidder would be less concerned with ai being smaller 
than di; thus, a lower bid-to-cover ratio would be attained. Therefore,  and 
 are expected to be positive. Next, for the coeﬃcients  and  , note 
that the term spread  widens when market participants? expectation 
that interest rates ?typically policy rates? will be raised between three- and 
six- months from now prevails. In this case, upward pressure would be exerted 
on the six- month bid-to-cover ratio because the attractiveness of the six-
month fixed-rate operations is enhanced. Thus, we expect that the sign of   
will be positive. However, the eﬀect of   on the ratio for the three-
month operation  is subtle: one possibility is that the ratio is not aﬀected by 
 because the comparative attractiveness of the fixed three-month rate 
in the auction is unchanged. The estimation result of Shino [??] is shown in Fig. 
?. The overnight indexed swap rates are chosen as the market rates. Consistent 
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with the view derived from the theoretical analysis that bid-to-cover ratios 
have been contained by lowered market interest rates, the coeﬃcients of  , 
 , and  are positive and statistically significant. The coeﬃcients of  
are negative but statistically insignificant.
 Now, we update the estimation of the reduced model using the latest 
available data. As mentioned in the Introduction, in July ????, the loan 
durations of ?? months? and ?? months? were integrated into ?within 
? months, ?and, following the introduction of the ??E, the six-month 
operations have not been implemented ?see Fig. ??. Therefore, we use only 
the three-month data here?. T-bill rates are adopted as market rates instead 
of the overnight indexed swap rates in the original estimation because of 
data availability ?there is no significant gap in the developments of these two 
rates?. Fig. ? shows the updated estimation result.
const αM?Market Rates? α
TS
?Term Spreads? R-squared No. of observations
?-month -?.???**??.????
???.???**
??.????
–??.???
???.???? ?.??? ???
?-month -?.???*??.????
??.???**
???.????
???.??*
???.???? ?.??? ??
Figure 7: Empirical results in Shino [22] [sample period: Dec. 2009–Dec. 2011]
Notes: ?. Confidence levels are ** for p ??.?? and * for p ? ?.??.
?. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.
const αM?Market Rates? α
TS
?Term Spreads? R-squared
No. of 
obs.
?m?with TS? ?.???**??.????
??.???**
??.????
14.???**
??.???? ?.??? ???
?m?without TS? ?.???**??.????
??.???**
??.???? -- ?.??? ???
Figure 8: Empirical results update [sample period: Jan. 2010–Aug. 2018]
Notes: ?. Confidence levels are ** for p ??.?? and * for p ? ?.??.
?. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.
75
Waseda Global Forum No. ??, ????, ?????
 The updated results remain quite reasonable. Two equations of ?with? 
and ?without? term spreads  are estimated and, in both cases, the 
coeﬃcients of   are positive and statistically significant. A point of diﬀerence 
compared with the original result is that  is statistically significant for 
the model with term spreads. A possible explanation for this is that when 
market participants? expectations of further monetary accommodation are 
strengthened, the slope of the yield curve between the three- and six-month 
operations becomes flatter because the six-month rate has relatively larger room 
to further decrease and such a strengthened market view also exerts downward 
pressure on bid-to-cover ratios for the three-month fixed-rate operations. In 
sum, this update provides clear evidence that lowered market interest rates have 
continued to contain bid-to-cover ratios.
 Finally, to examine the impact of the NIR applied to the complementary 
deposit facility on the bid- to-cover ratio, we estimate the following equations 
??? and ??? with dummy variable NIRt defined in ???.
 ???
    ???
 
???
By controlling the eﬀects of market interest rates in ??? and ???, we can 
examine two diﬀerent hypotheses for the impact of the NIR. If the increased 
opportunity cost generated by the introduction of the NIR policy decreases 
the demand for the operations, a view widely held by market participants, then 
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 would be negative. On the other hand, following Shino [??] and Funaki, 
Shino and Uto [??], if the increased opportunity cost has contributed to 
decreasing the degree of satiation, then a positive and statistically significant 
 is expected. Fig. ? shows the estimation result.
 The estimated coeﬃcient  is positive and statistically significant, 
which provides strong support for the second hypothesis. The NIR applied 
to the complementary deposit facility has contributed to increasing the 
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves and this increased cost has 
decreased the degree of satiation in the participants’ objective functions. 
Consequently, it has exerted upward pressure on the bid-to-cover ratio in the 
fixed-rate operations.
4  Conclusion
In this paper, we test two alternative hypotheses regarding the impact of the 
BOJ?s NIR policy on market participants? bidding patterns in fixed-rate 
funds-supplying operations. Our particular focus is on the levels of interest 
rates applied to the complementary deposit facility. The NIR policy applied 
to the facility increased the opportunity cost of obtaining excessive amounts 
of funds in the fixed-rate operations. One hypothesis widely held by market 
const α3M α3TS βNIR R-squared No. of obs.
Eq.??? ?.???**??.????
??.???**
??.????
??.???**
??.????
?.???**
??.???? ?.??? ???
Eq.??? ?.???**??.????
??.???**
??.???? ?
?.???**
??.???? ?.??? ???
Figure 9: Empirical results: Impact of the NIR policy on the bid-to-cover ratio
Notes: ?. Confidence levels are ** for p ??.?? and * for p ? ?.??.
?. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.
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participants is that this increase in opportunity costs influences bidding 
patterns as it decreases the demand for the operations; therefore, it eventually 
decreases the bid-to-cover ratio. An opposing hypothesis derived by Shino 
[??] and Funaki, Shino and Uto [??] is that the heightened opportunity cost 
decreases the degree of satiation in the participants? objective functions in the 
fixed-rate operations and this exerts upward pressure on the bid-to-cover ratio. 
The empirical results provide support for the second hypothesis.
 An important policy implication derived from our analysis is that 
changes in interest rates applied to the complimentary deposit facility can 
influence bidding patterns in fixed-rate operations through diﬀerent channels. If 
an increase in the opportunity cost of holding excessive funds resulted only in a 
shift of the participants? objective function to the left, then the estimated  
in ??? and ??? must be negative. The result that the estimated  is positive 
strongly implies the existence of another channel through which increased 
opportunity costs aﬀect the bidding behavior of the participants. The eﬀects on 
the degree of satiation in their objective functions is a persuasive explanation. 
If so, the following scenario would not be unrealistic. Suppose that the BOJ 
implements a further reduction in the NIR applied to the complementary 
deposit facility as a further monetary easing measure. As an initial reaction, the 
bid-to-cover ratio could decline because the eﬀect of the increased opportunity 
cost in reducing the initial demand di is dominant. However, the ratio could 
suddenly explode at a time when the eﬀects of the increased opportunity cost 
decreasing the degree of satiation become dominant. As overbidding in fixed-
rate operations reduces the eﬃciency of resource allocation among auction 
participants ?typically financial institutions? as Nautz and Oechssler [??] point 
out, it is crucial for central banks to closely monitor any changes in bidding 
patterns and changes in parameters in participants? objective functions.
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Notes
? The following description is largely based on Bank of Japan [?] and Shino [??]. 
Funds-supplying operations against pooled collateral are operations in which the BOJ 
extends loans to its counterparties. These loans are backed by pooled collateral that 
counterparties have submitted to the BOJ. These operations are highly convenient 
for counterparties because a wide range of assets, including government bonds, other 
public liabilities, and corporate debts, such as corporate bonds and commercial paper, 
are eligible and counterparties can easily make substitutions between forms of collateral. 
Pooled collateral refers to collateral that counterparties submit to the BOJ based on 
agreements pertaining to transactions with the BOJ, such as funds-supplying operations 
against pooled collateral, complementary lending facilities, intraday overdrafts, and 
other contracts.
? Ewerhart et al. [??] provides a detailed survey on uses of the fixed-rate tender in the 
Euro area and the United Kingdom.
? See, e.g., Fig. ?  of Nautz and Oechssler [??].
? The complementary deposit facility was introduced in October ???? by the BOJ to pay 
interest on excess reserves held by financial institutions. For more detail, see Bank of 
Japan [?].
? More precisely, a NIR of minus ?.? percent is applied to the outstanding balance of each 
financial institution?s current account at the BOJ in excess of the amounts outstanding of 
????Basic Balance? to which a positive interest rate of ?.? percent is applied? and ???
?Macro Add-on Balance? to which a zero-interest rate is applied? combined. Bank 
of Japan [?] [?] are formal documents stipulating the framework for a NIR on current 
accounts at the BOJ.
? Funaki, Shino and Uto [??] implements an experiment on fixed-rate operations and 
identifies subjects? bid functions. A calibration based on the estimated functions shows 
that a decrease in the degree of satiation pushes up subjects? bids.
? The description of the model that follows is mainly based on Shino [??].
? More precisely, the bid-to-cover ratio for operations with durations of ??-??? days are 
included in this estimation.
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